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STUDENT NOTEs
other, and is more than negligence, more than gross negligence, and is
such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or
safety of others." In People v. Adams,n the court said: "Wanton neg-
ligence implies a positive disregard of the rules of diligence and a
reckless heedlessness of consequences." Willful negligence may be
defined as "such conduct as evidences a reckless indifference to safety."n2
So we may conclude that willful and wanton disregard is synonymous
with the reckless disregard spoken of by the courts in our third class
of cases.
Gross negligence is the "omission of that care which even inat-
tentive and thoughtless men never fail to exercise." 3 The court in
People v. Adams 4 tells us that "gross negligence borders on reckless-
ness." In a civil case, Craig v. McAtee," the court said that gross neg-
ligence does not establish a rule of liability varying appreciably from
reckless disregard.
All of these definitions, while they are phrased differently, seem to
have at least one point in common: that to constitute criminal neg-
ligence, an act or omission must be evidence of a reckless disregard of
consequences which will result from such act or omission.
Realizing that a one sentence definition, to be of any use, must
be very broad, in order to cover all circumstances, it is with a great
deal of hesitation that we submit for criticism the following definition,
because in our effort to make the definition broad we may have exceeded
the limit and made it too broad. However, with all the definitions and
explanations which have been discussed above in mind, we submit the
following, which we consider to be a workable definition for criminal
negligence: Criminal Negligence is abnormally dangerous conduct of
such a nature as to indicate under all the circumstances, a reckless
disregard for human life and safety. We believe that this definition
embodies all of the characteristics of criminal negligence set out in the
cases which we have considered.
The adoption of a definition similar to the one proposed, would be
valuable not only in promoting a greater uniformity of decisions, but
also in providing a standard part of the court's instructions to the
jury. This would make for fewer reversals on appeal because of
erroneous instructions. Pmnxw ScRW.
LIVING APART WITHOUT COHABITATION AS A GROUND FOR
DIVORCE UNDER KENTUCKY LAW
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes' provides that, "Living apart without
any cohabitation for five years next before application" is ground for
divorce "... to both husband and wife". A similar provision is found in
n Supra, n. 5.
" Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661, 222 N. W. 42
(1928).
"Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343, 15 L. Ed. 934 (1857).
"Supra, n. 5.
160 Wash. 337, 295 Pac. 146 (1931).
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the statutes of Louisiana,2 North Carolina,' Rhode Island,, Texas,5 Wash-
ington,6 and Wisconsin.' Such a provision is not to be confused with
statutes making desertion a ground for divorce.8
Statutes such as this would seem to be based upon the proposition
that where a husband and wife have lived apart for a long period of
time without any intention to resume conjugal relations, the best
interests of society and the parties will be promoted by a dissolution.'
Living apart without cohabitation for five years next before appli-
cation entitles a spouse who has deserted the other to a divorce'30 The
complaining spouse may secure a divorce under this statute irrespective
of his or her fault."
This statute does not make living apart without cohabitation for
five years next before application, an absolute ground for divorce.12
A divorce will not be granted on the ground of living apart for five
consecutive years next before application, if one of the parties was
insane during this period." Where one spouse is permanently insane
and confined in an institution, the court, in denying a divorce to the
sane spouse where suit was brought under this statute, has said that
the defendant must have actively or passively contributed to the sepa-
ration,'14 and that "the statute assumes that the parties have lived
separate because of their mutual purpose to do so, or because one so
determined and the other acquiesced."'3 But if the parties had lived
separate without cohabitation for five years before the insanity oc-
curred, the subsequent insanity will not bar the divorce.3
1 (1936) section 2117.
2 Louisiana Act 269 of 1916.
3 North Carolina Code (1927) section 1659.
4 G. L. Rhode Island (1923) section 4214.
'Texas Statutes (Vernon, 1936) article 4629.
6 Washington Code (Pierce, 1929) section 7501.
7Wisconsin Statutes (1929) section 247.07.
'Table of such statutes, Vernier, American Family Law, (1932)
section 67.
9Cooke v. Cooke, 164 N. C. 272, 80 S. E. 178, 180 (1913); Camire
v. Camire, 43 R. I. 489, 113 At. 748 (1921).
"Hall v. Hall, 102 Ky. 297, 43 S. W. 429 (1897); Boreing v. Bore-
ing, 114 Ky. 522, 71 S. W. 431 (1903).
"Parker v. Parker, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1228, 104 S. W. 1028 (1907);
Ward v. Ward, 213 Ky. 606, 281 S. W. 801 (1926); Best v. Best, 218 Ky.
648, 291 S. W. 1032 (1927). Contra: Lee v. Lee, 182 N. C. 61, 108 S. E.
352 (1921); Pierce v. Pierce, 120 Wash. 411, 208 Pac. 49 (1922);
Jakubke v. Jakubke, 125 Wis. 635, 104 N. W. 704 (1905).
'Messick v. Messick, 177 Ky. 337, 339, 179 S. W. 792 (1917).
"Messick v. Messick, 177 Ky. 337, 179 S. W. 792 (1917); Ferguson
v. Ferguson, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 428 (1886); Pile v. Pile, 94 Ky. 308 (1893);
Camire v. Camire, 43 R. I. 489, 113 Atl. 748 (1921).
4Ferguson v. Ferguson, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 428 (1886); Messick v.
Messick, 17? Ky. 337, 339, 179 S. W. 792, 793 (1917).
'3Ferguson v. Ferguson, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 428 (1886); cf. Goudeau
V. Goudeau, 146 La. 742, 84 So. 39 (1920).
'a Andrews v. Andrews, 120 Ky. 718, 87 S. W. 1080, affd. 90 S. W.
581 (1905).
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Where the parties have lived apart for five years, a divorce has
been denied the husband on the ground the wife had had no notice of
the husband's intention to cease to live with her. However, absence
of the husband in prison will not prevent a divorce under this statute."
The cases are not clear as to whether "living apart" may be con-
structive so as to grant a divorce under this statute where the parties
are actually living in the same house. In Quinn v. Brown," the Louisi-
ana Court has said that the "living apart" must be such that the
neighborhood may see that they are not living together.2° The Ken-
tucky Court in Gates v. Gates2' denied a divorce on the ground of living
apart without cohabitation for five years, where the parties had con-
tinued to reside in the same house and had held themselves out as man
and wife, but where there had been no sexual intercourse between them
for over five years. In this case the court said, "sexual intercourse is
not all that is embraced in the legal phrase 'living and cohabitation
together as husband and wife' ".2 The case of Evans v. Evans2 must
be noticed in connection with the holding in Gates v. Gates. In Evans
v. Evans the parties continued to reside in the same house but the wife
had arbitrarily refused sexual intercourse for over five years. A
divorce was granted to the husband on his petition which alleged an
unjustified abandonment by the wife and cessation of cohabitation for
more than five years. The Kentucky Statutes ' provides for a divorce
to the party not in fault for "abandonment by one party or the other
for one year". The Kentucky Court holds that arbitrary refusal of
sexual intercourse is sufficient abandonment to grant a divorce under
this statute;w and although it appears that the ground relied upon for
the divorce in Evans v. Evans was living apart without cohabitation
for five consecutive years, the petition was probably sufficiently broad
to permit the decision to be placed on this ground, or, on the ground
of abandonment by one party or the other for one year. However, it
is not clear on which provision of the statute the case is rested, both
provisions apparently being considered as sufficient to grant the
divorce in this situation.
Our court holds that if both parties are in fault, a divorce will be
denied where both petition and cross-petition alleges an abandonment
17 Stevens v. Stevens, 123 Ky. 545, 96 S. W. 811, 29 Ky. L. Rep.
953 (1906) (wife thought husband would return after finding work).
But cf. Davis v. Davis, 102 Ky. 440, 43 S. W. 168, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 152
(1897).
"SAccord: Davis v. Davis, 102 Ky. 440, 43 S. W. 168, 19 Ky. Law
Rep. 1520 (1897).
" 159 La. 570, 105 So. 624 (1925).
"2Id. at 571, 105 So. at 625.
192 Ky. 253, 232 S. W. 378 (1921).
-1d. at 255, 232 S. W. at 378.
"247 Ky. 1, 56 S. W. (2d) 547 (1933).
2' (Carroll, 1936) section 2117, paragraph 2, subsection 2.
"Accord: Evans v. Evans, 93 Ky. 516, 20 S. W. 605 (1892). See
Axton v. Axton, (Ky.) 206 S. W. 480 (1918).
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by the other party for more than one year. Query: If both parties
are in fault in the sexual separation, and this condition continues for
five years, should a divorce not be granted on the ground of living apart
without cohabitation although the parties may have resided in this
same house during that period?"
"Living apart without cohabitation for five consecutive years next
before application""' is ground for divorce in the following situations:
1. Where either party has deserted the other and lived apart for
five years, irrespective of who was at fault in the separation .
2. Where the parties have lived apart for five consecutive years
because one of them was confined in prison.5
This statute is not ground for a divorce in the following situations:
1. Where the parties have lived apart for five consecutive years
but where one spouse was confined in an insane asylum for all or part
of that time2 -
2. Where the parties have lived apart for five consecutive years
-but where the defendant had no notice that the other spouse intended
to cease cohabitation.'
It is not clear whether a divorce would be allowed under this stat-
ute where the parties continued to live in the same house, but where
sexual intercourse was refused.'
Query: Would collusion prevent a divorce under this statute
where the parties lived apart by agreement for five years?5
ELWOOD ROSENBAUM.
APPLICATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE BY THE
KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS
Since the doctrine of last clear chance is the parent and prede-
cessor of the rule of law dealt with in this note, a preliminary analysis
of the last clear chance doctrine seems necessary.
"Garrison v. Garrison, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1209, 104 S. W. 980 (1907).
"It is submitted that, as the fault of the parties is immaterial
under this provision and abandonment is considered more serious than
living apart, a divorce should be allowed in this case.
"Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936) section 2117.
0See note 11, supra.
"See note 18, supra.
2See note 13, supra.
'See note 17, sitra.
"Compare Gates v. Gates, 192 Ky. 253, 282 S. W. 378 (1921) with
Evans v. Evans, 247 Ky. 1, 56 S. W. (2d) 547 (1933).
"It is submitted that if the statute assumes the parties have lived
apart because of their mutual purpose to do so, and if the proposition
underlying the statute is that stated in the introduction to this note,
collusion would not defeat an action for divorce in this instance.
